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INTRODUCTION
On September 30, 2013, North Carolina Attorney General Roy
Cooper had a problem. The federal government had just filed suit
against the state of North Carolina, alleging that the state's recently
* @ 2014 John E. Harris.
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passed "Voter I.D." law was unconstitutional.' The Republican-led
legislature had passed the bill just two months earlier,2 and as it sat
pending on Republican Governor Pat McCrory's desk, Cooper, an
independently elected Democrat, had come out against it.' After
initially sending Governor McCrory a letter urging him to veto the
bill,4 Cooper had created an online petition where members of the
public could show support for a veto as well.' Cooper's office had also
issued a press release, stating that the law "makes it harder for people
to register and vote," and that it would "do damage" to the state's
election process.' Despite Cooper's efforts, Governor McCrory
signed the bill into law on August 12.
Then came the lawsuit by the U.S. Department of Justice-and
Cooper's dilemma. The responsibility for defending the
constitutionality of state laws in court fell to his office,' but he had
quite clearly and publicly expressed his view that the statute "would
do damage" to the state.' As the state's Attorney General, was he
required to defend a law that he publicly opposed? Could he decline
to defend? What reasons would justify such a decision? What actions
could the General Assembly and Governor McCrory take to assure a
vigorous defense of the new statute that they both supported?
The law sheds some light on the answers to these inquiries but is
ultimately unclear. While this ambiguity is due in part to the historical
1. See Complaint at 30-31, United States v. North Carolina, No. 13-cv-861
(M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2013), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/
resources/646201393013723793555.pdf.
2. See Aaron Blake, North Carolina Governor Signs Extensive Voter ID Law, WASH.
POST (Aug. 12, 2013, 2:35 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics
/wp/2013/08/ 12/north-carolina-governor-signs-extensive-voter-id-law/.
3. Angelica Alvarez, Cooper Urges McCrory to Veto Voter ID Bill, Inside Politics,
ABC 11 (Aug. 8, 2013), http://abclocal.go.com/wtvd/story?section=news/politics&id
=9200506.
4. Id.
5. Id. For the language of the petition, see Governor McCrory: Stop the Assault on
Voting Rights, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/p/governor-mccrory-stop-the-
assault-on-voting-rights (last visited May 5, 2014).
6. Lucy Butcher, Attorney General Launches Petition Asking McCrory to Veto
Voting Restriction Bill, THE CAROLINA MERCURY (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://www.carolinamercury.com/2013/08/attomey-general-launches-petition-asking-gov-
to-veto-voting-restriction-bill-hb589/.
7. Blake, supra note 2.
8. See Robert Morgan, The Office of the Attorney General, 2 N.C. CENT. L.J. 165, 167
(1970) ("[Tlhe logical conclusion in interpreting the common law was that the Attorney
General had the duty and the exclusive right to represent ... governments and their
agencies and officers.").
9. Butcher, supra note 6.
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development of the office of Attorney General,o it is also likely
attributable to the Democratic Party's dominance of state
government in the past century." While political and policy conflicts
inevitably occurred, these disputes generally took place within a
single-party framework, and North Carolina courts were rarely forced
to determine the relative rights and obligations of the Attorney
General.12 As a result, the Attorney General's duty to defend the
constitutionality of state laws and the intra-government relationships
involved in such a defense have received only limited treatment by
state courts. Meanwhile, a changing political dynamic in North
Carolina 4 and a growing willingness among attorneys general in other
states to decline to defend their states' laws in court" have added
renewed relevance to these important questions.16 As Attorney
10. See infra Part I (describing the history of the development of the office of the
Attorney General in North Carolina).
11. Since the turn of the twentieth century, the Democratic Party has exercised
control over all levels of state government. Between 1901 and 2013, Democrats controlled
the governor's mansion for all but three terms. See North Carolina: Past Governors Bios,
NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N, http://www.nga.org/cms/home/governors/past-governors-
bios/page.north carolina.html (last visited February 16, 2014). Likewise, between 1901
and 1995, Democrats maintained majority control of both chambers of the North Carolina
General Assembly. While the North Carolina House of Representatives experienced some
variation in control between 1994 and 2010, including a brief period of a 60-60 partisan
split among House members, see Decker Switches to Democrats, Giving House Even Split,
WRAL (Jan. 25, 2003), http://www.wral.com/news/loca/story/1089942/?commentorder
=forward, Democrats maintained control of the North Carolina Senate until 2011, see
Lynn Bonner & Michael Biescker, GOP Takes the General Assembly, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/11/03
1777711/gop-takes-the-general-assembly.html. Republicans' century-long drought of
legislative and executive control ended when Republicans secured majorities in both
chambers following the 2010 elections, see id., and added the Governor's office in 2012.
See John Frank, Governor: McCrory Becomes First Republican to Win Governor's Race in
20 Years, NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) (Nov. 3, 2010),
http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/11/07/2466550/governor-mccrory-expected-to-
easily.html.
12. Cf Martin v. Thornburg, 320 N.C. 533, 359 S.E.2d 472 (1987) (discussing the
relative powers and obligations of the Attorney General and the Governor). Interestingly,
Martin is one of the only North Carolina cases discussing the respective rights and
obligations of the Attorney General and other government actors in representing the
state, and the case was brought by the administration of former Governor Jim Martin, one
of only two Republicans elected to the governorship between 1901 and 2012. See id.
13. See Katherine Shaw, Constitutional Non-Defense in the States, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 213, 217 (2014) (claiming that her most recent article is the first national review of
the discretion of state attorneys general to defend laws).
14. See supra note 11.
15. See Shaw, supra note 13, at 237 (providing four case studies of executive non-
defense in the states, stating that these examples were a few "of many").
16. See id. at 214-15 (discussing the new relevance of the non-defense debate in light
of the federal government's stance on the Defense of Marriage Act).
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General Cooper's dilemma illustrates, this changing legal and
political environment deserves additional exploration. This Comment
seeks to engage in such exploration by sketching out the edges of the
powers and obligations of the office of the North Carolina Attorney
General and other government actors with respect to the defense of
the state's laws. These edges are admittedly rough, but, at bottom,
this analysis provides a framework for thinking through elected
officials' potential responses when the State's laws are challenged.
The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I will review the
historical development of the North Carolina Attorney General, as
well as set out the current sources of the office's authority and
responsibilities. Part II will then examine the Attorney General's duty
to defend in North Carolina, establish a framework for evaluating the
availability of non-defense, and present two specific arguments that
might justify declining to defend a state law. Finally, Part III will
examine the legal options available to other government actors to
assure an adequate defense of a law-both if the Attorney General
defends it and if he or she chooses not to do so.
I. THE NORTH CAROLINA ATTORNEY GENERAL: AN "ANCIENT
AND HONORABLE OFFICE" 17
A. Historical Development"
The office of Attorney General originated in England sometime
over the course of the late thirteenth century,19 although apparently
not as an office, but rather simply as a reference to the regular
employment of a personal attorney to represent the King before his
courts.20 By the mid-fifteenth century, however, the position had
taken on an official capacity-the attornatus generalis in Anglia2 1
17. Morgan, supra note 8, at 165.
18. Although a comprehensive review of the origins and authority of the North
Carolina Attorney General is not within the purview of this article, any undertaking to
investigate the office's powers and duties must begin with a basic review of the
development of the office of Attorney General and its current position within the state's
constitutional scheme.
19. See Morgan, supra note 8, at 165 (stating that the office may have come into
existence as early as 1278 A.D.); see also JAMES WILLIAM NORTON-KYSHE, THE LAW
AND PRIVILEGES RELATING TO THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND SOLICITOR-GENERAL
OF ENGLAND 2 (photo. reprint 1979) (1897) ("[T]he first mention made of an advocate
being regularly employed on behalf of the King appears in the reign of Henry III, when it
is recorded that one Lawrence del Brok pleaded for the King ... from 1253 to 1267.").
20. See NORTON-KYSHE, supra note 19, at 1 (stating that the term "Attorney
General" or "General Attorney" likely meant only a general representative).
21. Id. at 3.
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and by the seventeenth century, the office had assumed its modern
place as "the preeminent legal representative of the Sovereign."22
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the office
developed a dual role.23 On the one hand, the English Attorney
General served as "the law agent and adviser of the Sovereign," a
role consistent with the earliest outgrowths of the office, when the
Crown was an individual political entity somewhat distinct from the
concept of the "State." 24 On the other hand, as English political
institutions solidified, the Attorney General was understood to
represent the State itself, rather than simply the Crown.25 in effect,
the King's attorney became England's attorney.26 This public function
ultimately formed the basis for the common law view that "the
Attorney General was in possession of nearly unlimited powers to act
unilaterally as the representative of the people's legal interests." 27
It was in this form that the office of the Attorney General came
to the American colonies, including North Carolina.? The colonial
governments appointed attorneys general on behalf of the Crown,
and these officers possessed the same powers as the English Attorney
General, essentially serving as his representatives abroad. 29 After the
American Revolution, all thirteen newly formed states adopted the
office of the Attorney General in one form or another.?
B. The North Carolina Attorney General
Although the office's particular place in the state's constitutional
scheme has shifted over time, North Carolina has included the
Attorney General among its constitutional officers from the very
22. Rufus L. Edmisten, The Common Law Powers of the Attorney General of North
Carolina, 9 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 4 (1977).
23. See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys
General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2449-50 (2006)
(stating that during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, "the Attorney General
established that his duty of representation extended to the public interest and not just to
the ministries of government").
24. NORTON-KYSHE, supra note 19, at 74-75.
25. See id. at 75.
26. Id. ("[T]he Attorney General in his public capacity [became] the representative of
the nation.").
27. Michael Signer, Constitutional Crisis in the Commonwealth: Resolving the
Conflicts Between Governors and Attorneys General, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 43, 55 (2006).
28. See Edmisten, supra note 22, at 5. The original Carolina colony was comprised of
what is currently both North Carolina and South Carolina, and the colony had just one
Attorney General. Id. By 1767, however, North Carolina had its own colonial Attorney
General selected from the lawyers in the territory. Id.
29. See id.
30. See Marshall, supra note 23, at 2450.
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beginning of its independent statehood. North Carolina's first
constitution, ratified in 1776, established the office but prescribed no
duties or powers.3 ' Interestingly, this first constitution placed the
Attorney General within the judicial branch of government,
"apparently on the theory that he was an officer of the court,"32 and
directed the General Assembly to appoint the Attorney General,
along with judges, to lifetime tenure.
The Constitution of 1868,1 adopted after the Civil War, changed
this scheme by placing the Attorney General within the newly created
"Executive Department"" as an ex officio legal adviser to it. 36 He was
to be publicly elected to four-year terms, and the office's duties were
to be "prescribed by law."" During this period, the general
responsibilities and obligations of the modern North Carolina
Attorney General developed as the General Assembly acted on its
constitutional mandate and created a statutory framework for the
office." This involved the expansion of some powers, such as a
solidified role as the legal representative of the growing state
apparatus, continued expansion of the responsibility to handle all
criminal appeals, and explicit recognition of the right to bring actions
in certain areas of the public interest.40 The General Assembly also
diminished other responsibilities, particularly in the criminal arena, as
the legislature opted for a model of district solicitors4 1 to manage
most of the state's criminal prosecutions at the trial level.42
It was within this evolving legal framework that the new
Constitution of 1971, currently in force today, was constructed and
ratified. Although the 1971 Constitution included some significant
structural changes to various parts of state government, it left the
fundamental arrangement of the Attorney General's office intact.43
31. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 13.
32. JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION 6 n.20 (2d ed.
2011).
33. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 13.
34. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. III, § 1.
35. Id.
36. Id. § 14.
37. Id. § 1.
38. Id. § 13.
39. See Albert Coates, The State's Legal Business, 16 N.C. L. REv. 119, 128 (1938).
40. See id. at 128-33. Examples of these actions in the "public interest" include
antitrust suits and actions enforcing charitable trusts. Id.
41. See id. at 128. These solicitors were the predecessors of our modem-day District
Attorneys.
42. Id.
43. Compare N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. III, §§ 1, 13 (placing the Attorney General
within the "Executive Department" and having his or her duties prescribed by law), with
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The Attorney General continues to be elected statewide every four
years," to serve as an "Officer" in the executive branch, 45 and to have
his or her duties "prescribed by law."' No other constitutional
powers or duties are assigned to the office.47
The constitutional direction that the Attorney General's duties
are to be "prescribed by law"" makes the General Statutes of North
Carolina the primary basis for defining the scope of the office.49 The
"most significant statutory grouping of powers" is found in section
114 of the General Statutes, 0 which establishes a Department of
Justice, headed by the Attorney General, and lays out the office's
authority and obligations." Importantly, the statute sets out from the
beginning that the North Carolina Attorney General retains the
powers of the Attorney General at common law.52 While the scope of
these powers will be discussed in further detail,53 generally "[t]he
Attorney General, as primary legal officer of the state, has
consistently been viewed in common law jurisdictions as possessing
the power to initiate, conduct, and maintain any suits necessary for
N.C. CONST. art. III, § 7 (listing the Attorney General under the "Executive" article and
having his or her duties prescribed by law). While the fundamental arrangement of the
office stayed the same, there were some minor changes. Most notably, the 1971
Constitution dispensed with the language of the "Executive Department," and instead
broke out the descriptions of the offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor, and then
denoted the remaining members of the executive as "officers," within the "Executive"
article. See N.C. CONST. art. III. Other slight changes relevant to the Attorney General
include (1) adding the Attorney General as an official member of the Council of State,
N.C. CONST. art. III, § 8; (2) mandating that the Attorney General be a licensed attorney,
N.C. CONST. art. III, § 7(7); and (3) not including the Attorney General on the State
Board of Education, as he was under the 1868 Constitution, compare N.C. CONST. of 1868,
art. IX, § 7 ("The Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor,
Superintendent of Public Works, Superintendent of Public Instruction and Attorney
General, shall constitute a State Board of Education."), with N.C. CONST., art. IX, § 4
("The State Board of Education shall consist of the Lieutenant Governor, the Treasurer,
and eleven members appointed by the Governor subject to confirmation by the General
Assembly in joint session.").





49. See Lacy H. Thornburg, Changes in the State's Law Firm: The Powers, Duties, and
Operations of the Office ofAttorney General, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 343, 346 (1990).
50. Id.
51. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114 (2013).
52. Id. § 114-1.1 ("The General Assembly reaffirms that the Attorney General has
had and continues to be vested with those powers of the Attorney General that existed at
the common law, that are not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of
North Carolina.").
53. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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enforcement of the laws of the state, preservation of order, and
protection of public rights."5 4 In addition to these common law
powers, the General Statutes provide other specific duties and powers
at the disposal of the Attorney General." Thus, one must turn to
these statutes to elicit and evaluate the extent of the Attorney
General's duty to defend the constitutionality of the laws of the state.
II. To DEFEND OR NOT TO DEFEND?
A. The Duty to Defend in North Carolina
The immediate and rather obvious inquiry is whether a duty to
defend even exists in North Carolina. As the development of the
office suggests, 6 the duty of representing both the public interest at
large and individual government actors in their official capacity has
historically fallen to the Attorney General." But the question remains
as to whether the duty to defend is legally mandated or merely a
government norm.
Although the answer at the federal level and in other states is not
particularly clear," North Carolina's statutory instructions provide
that when the state's laws are challenged, the Attorney General has a
duty to defend the State and its statutes in court.59 The primary legal
basis for this duty is found in section 114-2(1) of the General Statutes,
which states:
It shall be the duty of the Attorney General: (1) To defend all
actions in the appellate division in which the State shall be
interested, or a party, and to appear for the State in any other
court or tribunal in any cause or matter, civil or criminal, in
which the State may be a party or interested.W
Notably, although slightly modified over time, this statute was
one of the first passed by the General Assembly after the ratification
of the Constitution of 1868.6' Thus, it is fair to say that once the office
was cast in an executive capacity, the law has generally recognized a
duty on the part of the Attorney General to defend the State in
54. Edmisten, supra note 22, at 10.
55. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 114-2 to -8.5 (2013).
56. See supra Part I.
57. See generally Edmisten, supra note 22 (describing the historical scope of the office
of the North Carolina Attorney General).
58. See Shaw, supra note 13, at 214-17.
59. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-2(1) (2013).
60. Id.
61. See Coates, supra note 39, at 128-29.
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court.62 Likewise, since 2001, the Attorney General has been required
to submit biannual reports to the legislative leadership and staff
regarding all lawsuits in which the constitutionality of a North
Carolina law has been challenged.' This statute certainly indicates
legislative understanding, if not intent, that defense of such suits
against the State falls within the purview of the Attorney General."
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has also weighed in on the
duty to defend the State or its agencies in all actions in which the
State is a party, including, ostensibly, when the constitutionality of a
law is challenged.6 5 In Martin v. Thornburg,66 a case later discussed in
more detail,67 the Governor argued that the Attorney General's
statutory duty to appear for the State in all proceedings in which it
was a party violated the state constitution because it was in
derogation of the inherent executive power constitutionally vested in
the Governor.' In rejecting this argument, the court reaffirmed the
Attorney General's duty to defend.69 Specifically, the court stated that
"the duties of the Attorney General in North Carolina as prescribed
by statutory and common law include the duty to appear for and to
defend the State or its agencies in all actions in which the State may
be a party or interested."o
B. Declining Defense-A Three-Pronged Framework
Together, the language of the North Carolina statute and the
authority interpreting it send a clear message: the Attorney General
has a duty to defend in North Carolina." Nevertheless, even a rather
explicit duty to defend may not rule out the option of non-defense
altogether.7 2 At the federal level and across several states, executive
officials have redefined the boundaries of their legal responsibilities
62. See Martin v. Thornburg, 320 N.C. 533, 546, 359 S.E.2d 472, 479 (1987).
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-2.6 (2013).
64. See id.
65. See Martin, 320 N.C. at 545-46, 359 S.E.2d at 479.
66. 320 N.C. 533, 359 S.E.2d 472 (1987).
67. See infra Part III.B.1.
68. Martin, 320 N.C. at 535, 359 S.E.2d at 473.
69. Id. at 546, 359 S.E.2d at 479.
70. Id.
71. See supra Part II.A.
72. See Shaw, supra note 13, at 257-63 (detailing the ways in which state executives
may effectively avoid defending a law, even in the face of statutes expressly limiting their
powers to refuse to defend).
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regarding the defense of statutes, particularly when the
constitutionality of the law is reasonably in question.
Is the same option of non-defense legally available to the North
Carolina Attorney General? The answer is not straightforward;
rather, determining whether non-defense is justified in the face of a
well-defined duty to defend requires a fundamental analysis of the
nuances of executive power. This Comment proposes a three-pronged
conceptual framework for teasing out the potential legal bases for
non-defense in North Carolina.
1. Identifying Conflicting Legal Obligations
Logically speaking, refusing to discharge a well-defined duty to
defend should only be justified when some other competing legal
obligation preempts it. Thus, the first prong of the non-defense
framework requires determining whether the Attorney General has
other legal obligations that potentially conflict with the duty to
defend. When such potential exists, the Attorney General must
decide in his or her independent judgment whether a conflict does in
fact exist, and if so, whether the competing legal obligation preempts
the duty to defend.74 In short, some duties trump others, and
identifying potential inconsistencies between two legitimate
obligations of the office lays the logical foundation for justifying non-
defense.
2. Isolating the Operative Conflict
The next prong requires isolating the operative conflict between
potentially inconsistent duties. For instance, there may always be the
potential for conflict between the Attorney General's duty to defend
state law and a duty to uphold the U.S. Constitution; however, that
conflict only materializes if a challenged law is unconstitutional. If
constitutional, the Attorney General may discharge both duties
73. See id. at 237-46. Shaw points to four different cases of executive non-defense in
the states in recent years, including non-defense by the Attorneys General in Hawaii and
California of gay marriage laws, non-defense of a campaign finance regulation in
Nebraska, and non-defense of a ban on partial-birth abortion in New Jersey. Id.
74. See id. at 217 (discussing that non-defense most often arises in the context of
"choos[ing] between competing obligations to defend statutes, on the one -hand, and to
maintain fidelity to state and federal constitutions, on the other"). Examples of these
competing obligations include the duty to uphold the constitution, see infra Part II.C.2,
and the duty to represent the public interest, see infra Part II.C.1. Although most often
these considerations will be framed in constitutional terms, conceivably, any number of
duties that create a potential conflict may leave room for discretion to decline defense.
75. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the duty to uphold the U.S. Constitution as a
result of having taken the oath of office).
2036 [Vol. 92
2014] ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DUTY TO DEFEND
concurrently: there is no conflict. If unconstitutional, however, the
Attorney General's duty to defend and duty to uphold the
Constitution are obviously inconsistent. Thus, the operative conflict
between these two competing duties is the constitutionality of the
challenged law.
Although this is a somewhat straightforward observation,
isolating the operative conflict between competing duties is important
because it constrains the parameters of the Attorney General's
independent judgment. In the example above, the only thing the
Attorney General should be assessing to determine whether or not to
defend the challenged law is its constitutionality. Ideally, other
considerations, such as policy or political preferences, should be left
out of the analysis.7 6 Isolating the operative conflict therefore
provides a means of narrowly evaluating the conflicting duties
without resorting to extraneous and arguably unauthorized"
justifications for non-defense.
3. Evaluating the Conflicting Legal Obligations
The final prong of the non-defense framework involves deciding
whether the potentially conflicting legal obligations are actually
inconsistent, thereby justifying non-defense. At this stage, it is
tempting to treat this determination as binary. For example, if the
operative conflict is the constitutionality of the challenged law, under
a binary line of thought, the law is either constitutional, or it is not;
the Attorney General makes this determination and proceeds.
This binary conception, however, is ill-suited to the practical
realities of the Attorney General's available options. For that reason,
a better conceptual framework can be derived from Justice Jackson's
seminal concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer," in
which he describes executive power as something of a spectrum,
waxing and waning as it corresponds to legislative authorization and
76. Eliminating non-legal considerations is not always warranted, such as when policy
grounds form the primary justification for the conflict in duties. See infra Part II.C.1. Even
when eliminating these considerations is required, the realities of decision-making suggest
that political and policy preferences will inevitably affect the judgment of constitutionality
to some degree.
77. Justifications are unauthorized under this formulation if they are not based on the
logical predicate for declining defense-conflicting duties. See supra Part II.B.1. While an
Attorney General may assert a variety of justifications for why he or she does not want to
defend a law, not the least of which could be his or her disagreement on policy grounds,
these justifications must be hemmed in by the actual conflict between relative duties.
78. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Although the opinion in Youngstown dealt with presidential
power, see id., Justice Jackson's general conception of executive power is useful across the
executive realm.
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prohibition, respectively." Similarly, one can conceive of the
Attorney General's options for evaluating whether a conflict truly
exists as lying on a spectrum. At one end, there is no conflict between
competing duties, and the power to decline defense is non-existent.
At the other end, there is a clear conflict between competing duties,
and declining defense is very likely within his or her legal authority.
In between, however, is the infamous "zone of twilight," in which the
Attorney General's duties may not clearly conflict, but may not
clearly be consistent.'
An example is useful for understanding this fluid concept.
Suppose the Attorney General has a well-defined duty to defend and
a well-defined duty to uphold the United States Constitution. As
discussed, the operative conflict in that situation is the
constitutionality of the challenged statute. When determining
whether there is a conflict between the two duties, a number of
options are available along a spectrum. At one end, all the relevant
case law may suggest that the law is clearly constitutional. In that
case, there would be no conflict, and the Attorney General's
authority to decline defense would be non-existent. At the other end
of the spectrum, perhaps no plausible argument can be made in
support of a law's constitutionality. At that end, there would clearly
be a conflict, and the Attorney General's authority to decline defense
would be at its maximum."
However, a number of other options lie along the same
spectrum. The Attorney General may decide that a plausible
argument for constitutionality exists, although many courts, but not
all, have rejected it. Similarly, the Attorney General may decide that
a reasonable argument for constitutionality exists, but that the call is
truly a toss-up. Perhaps most difficult are those constitutional
questions that involve significant policy questions, such as substantive
due process claims, wherein societal conceptions of "ordered liberty"
79. Id. at 635-40.
80. See id. at 637.
81. Attorney General Roy Cooper invoked this very argument, in fact, when he
announced that he would no longer defend North Carolina's constitutional provision
prohibiting same-sex marriage. See Anne Blythe & Andrew Kenney, AG Roy Cooper Says
Federal Ruling May Allow Gay Marriage in NC, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) (July
28, 2014), http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/07/28/4035691/ag-roy-cooper-says-federal-
decision.html. In making the decision to no longer defend the law, Cooper stated that "it is
time to stop making arguments we will lose" and that "[tihere are really no arguments left
to be made." See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For a discussion evaluating this
decision, see infra note 115.
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are at play.' Whose policy considerations should the Attorney
General use in making the constitutionality determination-his or her
own, those of the "public," or those of the legislature who passed the
law?
This example highlights the difficulty of pinning down whether
declining to defend falls within the legal authority of the Attorney
General. Ultimately, these decisions are highly fact-specific and
require an extensive exercise of the professional judgment of the
Attorney General and his or her office. Nevertheless, conceptualizing
the power to refuse to defend as falling along a spectrum offers a
useful framework for reviewing such a decision, both prospectively
and retrospectively.
C. Declining to Defend in North Carolina
This three-pronged conceptual framework for understanding
non-defense also serves as a useful guide for examining specific legal
arguments potentially available to the North Carolina Attorney
General to decline defense. Two arguments in particular stand out as
potentially available, resting on two different features of the North
Carolina Attorney General: (1) the common law duty to represent
the public interest; and (2) the Attorney General's constitutional oath
of office.
1. The Common Law Duty to Represent the Public Interest
North Carolina has adopted the common law of England,
asserting by statute that all parts of the common law not inconsistent
with state law remain in force." This includes the common law
powers of the English Attorney General that existed at the time of
the signing of the Declaration of Independence,' a fact that the
General Assembly has reaffirmed explicitly via statute." Perhaps
because the Attorney General's powers are generally well defined by
statute, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has not defined the
scope of the supplemental duties recognized at common law. The
court has stated generally, however, that "the Attorney General of
[North Carolina] has the common law duty to prosecute all actions
82. See, e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 270 (2008).
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (2013).
84. Martin v. Thornburg, 320 N.C. 533, 545, 359 S.E.2d 472, 479 (1987).
85. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-1.1 (2013) ("The General Assembly reaffirms that the
Attorney General has had and continues to be vested with those powers of the Attorney
General that existed at the common law, that are not repugnant to or inconsistent with the
Constitution or laws of North Carolina.").
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necessary for the protection and defense of the property and revenue
of the sovereign people of North Carolina."' As a result, courts in
North Carolina have recognized that these common law powers make
the Attorney General a broader legal representative of the public
interest, with rights and responsibilities beyond those codified in
statute. This empowerment, by its nature, seems to place significant
discretion in the office to decide what, in fact, the public interest
entails and how to pursue it.
Thus, the first prong of the three-pronged framework is readily
apparent: there is a potential conflict between the duty to defend and
the Attorney General's duty to represent the public interest. 8 On the
one hand, when the constitutionality of a law is challenged, the State
clearly has an interest in having its laws upheld.89 This interest may,
however, conflict with the Attorney General's conception of the
public interest and could arguably justify a non-defense decision in
light of the duty to be the legal representative of the greater public."
Importantly, the operative conflict here is not the constitutionality of
the law; rather, the operative conflict is the challenged law's
consistency with the public interest. As a result, under the third
prong,91 the Attorney General's legal authority to decline defense lies
on a spectrum based on the Attorney General's conception of the
public interest. This conception produces an interesting result: the
justifications for non-defense may not necessarily be purely legal.
The Voter I.D. lawsuit and the dilemma it posed for Attorney
General Cooper helps illustrate the point.' Recall that Attorney
General Cooper publicly stated that the recently passed Voter I.D.
law would "make[] it harder for people to register and vote" and
would "do damage" to North Carolina's election process.93 These
statements illustrate that, to some degree, he viewed the law as
contrary to the public interest.9 4 But are these general policy concerns
alone sufficient to justify non-defense? Logically they serve as a
86. Martin, 320 N.C. at 546, 359 S.E.2d. at 479.
87. See Edmisten, supra note 22, at 10-13.
88. See supra Part II.B.1.
89. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2013).
90. See Edmisten, supra note 22, at 10 ("[The Attorney General's] broad authority, if
interpreted generously in light of the changing legal, governmental, and social structures
of our society, can be viewed as permitting the Attorney General to protect the public
from many abuses of law which, from a practical standpoint, they are helpless to protect
themselves.").
91. See supra Part II.B.3.
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legitimate measure of conflicting duties; one cannot be the
independently elected defender of the public interest without some
extra-legal conception of the public interest.95 At the same time, the
Attorney General's role is as a legal representative of the state.96
A reasonable resolution of this difficult problem hearkens back
to the conception of the executive power spectrum, in which the
authority to decline defense grows stronger as the conflict between
relevant duties grows stronger.97 Thus, inconsistency with the public
interest is at its strongest when legal arguments weigh in favor of
unconstitutionality and when the Attorney General's policy views
support that inconsistency; likewise, this is when declining defense is
most justified. As legal arguments lose their power and policy
differences are the only arrow left in the Attorney General's quiver,
perhaps non-defense may still be justified, but it would be a much
harder question.
Although such a specific annunciation of common law powers
has never been invoked in North Carolina to justify the non-defense
of a state statute,98 there is legal authority that offers at least some
support for the proposition that the Attorney General's common law
powers justify an independent evaluation of state statutes. 9
Specifically, there is authority suggesting that "by virtue of the
inherent authority of [the Attorney General's] office, [he] may bring
an action on his own initiative to challenge the constitutionality of
state statutes."" One example is a 1915 North Carolina Supreme
Court case, in which the Attorney General, acting in his official
capacity, challenged the constitutionality of a legislative enactment
allowing women to serve as notaries public.'01 In that case, the court
explicitly acknowledged that the Attorney General brought the action
as a plaintiff, exercised appellate rights, and "strenuously insisted that
the act of the General Assembly [in question] was invalid ... ."I
Nonetheless, "[t]he Supreme Court did not consider it necessary to
cite any authority for the Attorney General to bring such an action,
and neither the majority opinion nor the dissent discusses the
95. See Edmisten, supra note 22, at 10-11.
96. See id. at 13 (discussing representation of the public interest primarily in terms of
bringing legal actions).
97. See supra Part II.B.3.
98. There is no specific case in North Carolina in which an Attorney General has
actively declined to defend the constitutionality of a challenged state statute.
99. See Edmisten, supra note 22, at 14.
100. Id.
101. Bickett v. Knight, 169 N.C. 333, 85 S.E. 418 (1915).
102. Id. at 340, 85 S.E. at 422.
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authority of the Attorney General to challenge the constitutionality
of state laws." 103
Such authority supports the argument that there may be conflict
inherent in the Attorney General's legal responsibilities and that
independent assessments of the constitutionality of a state statute
may arise from the Attorney General's common law duty to protect
the public interest. Moreover, if the Attorney General has the ability
under the common law powers to challenge the constitutionality of a
state statute outright, declining to defend-a seemingly "lesser"
offense-would appear to fall within the legal parameters of his or
her powers.
As a result, although this argument has its limits, one conceivable
legal basis for the Attorney General declining to defend the
constitutionality of a state law is the assertion that to do so would be
inconsistent with the overarching common law duty, acknowledged
by statute, to legally represent the public interest.
2. The Oath of Office
The North Carolina Constitution's oath of office provides a
second argument available to the Attorney General to justify
declining to defend a state law in court. Article VI, section 7 of the
North Carolina Constitution of 1971 requires any person elected or
appointed to a state office to swear the following oath:
I ... do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and
maintain the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
the Constitution and laws of North Carolina not inconsistent
therewith, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of my
office as [designated office], so help me God.104
Although the oath is somewhat standard fare, the plain language of
the oath reveals a rather obvious potential for conflict, satisfying the
first prong of the non-defense framework.'o Constitutional officers,
including the Attorney General, must swear to support and maintain
the U.S. Constitution and federal laws without qualification, while
swearing to support and maintain the state's constitution and laws
only to the extent they are consistent with those of the United
States.1 06 Who gets to decide whether state laws are, in fact, consistent
with federal law?
103. Edmisten, supra note 22, at 14.
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One answer is that the oath of office gives rise to some level of
independent executive constitutional evaluation, at least until the
judiciary has acted as the final arbiter of the statute's
constitutionality." Under this line of thought, the executive cannot
discharge his or her constitutional duties consistent with the oath of
office without making some determination of the constitutionality of
a law.' Otherwise, enforcing or defending a law he or she determines
to be unconstitutional would violate the oath of office and, thereby,
the Constitution.'" The operative conflict between the duty to defend
and the constitutional obligations embodied in the oath of office thus
becomes clear: the constitutionality of the challenged law." 0
As a result, the third prong of the non-defense framework
requires once again examining the potential options available to the
Attorney General in terms of assessing constitutionality. Although
conceptually the ends of the spectrum form neat little boxes, in
practical terms, very few laws whose constitutionality are facially
challenged are either clearly constitutional or clearly not."' Thus, the
majority of the "action" in the oath-of-office argument is determining
at what point the lack of reasonable or plausible arguments begins to
justify non-defense. Certainly, as reasonable claims of
constitutionality dwindle, the case for non-defense grows stronger.
But if there is a plausible-albeit farfetched-constitutional claim, is
the Attorney General required to make it?
Interestingly, at the federal level, absent other categorical
exceptions to defense, the Office of the Solicitor General generally
draws this line at "professionally respectable" or "reasonable"
107. See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112
COLUM. L. REv. 507, 523-26 (2012) (discussing the oath of office as justifying executive
non-defense and non-enforcement at the federal level).
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. See supra Part II.B.2. Interestingly, a few simple words could eliminate this
argument altogether. Consider if the oath of office read as follows: "I do solemnly swear
that I will support and maintain the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the
Constitution and laws of North Carolina not having been determined by appropriate
members of the judiciary to be inconsistent therewith . . . ."
111. It should be noted that, if the law were in fact patently unconstitutional, the duty
to the U.S. Constitution is clearly superior to the state statutory duty to defend. In that
case, one may reasonably state that the Attorney General has the duty not to defend the
law, rather than simply an option at the Attorney General's disposal. However,
conceptually, it is simpler to conceive the two conflicting duties as providing the
availability of non-defense, particularly because the means of determining
unconstitutionality is such a sticky issue. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
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arguments.112 This policy is rooted in a "presumption" that legislative
and executive actors believed the legislation to be constitutional at
the time of its passage, and thus, the Solicitor General "tr[ies] to craft
a defense of the law in a manner that can best explain the basis on
which the political branches' presumed constitutional judgment must
have been predicated.""' As a result, the Solicitor General will
generally defend if such reasonable arguments are available.114
Such a conception may be a suitable model for the North
Carolina Attorney General, as it attempts to strike a balance between
due deference to other branches of government while also
recognizing the necessity of professional judgment given the office's
legal expertise."' Alternative conceptions may move further in the
112. Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1078, 1084 (2001).
Three exceptions to this general principle abide at the federal level. See id. at 1083-87.
First, if "it is manifest that the [current] President has concluded that [a] statute is
unconstitutional," the Solicitor General will "occasionally" decline to "make
professionally respectable arguments." Id. at 1083. A second and "categorical" exception
is when federal legislation "raises separation of powers concerns," in which case the
Solicitor General "ordinarily defends the President's powers and prerogatives," while
Congress defends its own views. Id. at 1084. A third is "when defending the statute would
require the Solicitor General to ask the Supreme Court to overrule one of its
constitutional precedents." Id. at 1085.
113. Id. at 1078.
114. Id.
115. See id. Recent action by Attorney General Roy Cooper suggests that, at least at
present, North Carolina seems to be following the "balanced" model. On July 28, 2014, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Bostic v. Schaefer that Virginia's prohibitions on
same-sex marriage were unconstitutional. Bostic v. Schaefer, No. 14-1167, 2014 WL
3702493 (4th Cir. July 28, 2014). Later that afternoon, Roy Cooper announced in a press
conference that North Carolina would no longer be defending its own constitutional
prohibition on same-sex marriage. See Blythe & Kenney, supra note 81. Although Cooper
did not invoke his oath of office directly, he stated that he would discontinue defense
because the Fourth Circuit's decision would bind all North Carolina federal courts; given
the breadth of that decision, he stated that "[t]here are really no arguments left to be
made" in defense of the law. Id.
Cooper's decision helps practically illustrate the spectrum of choices the Attorney
General has before him when determining whether to defend. Although Cooper
determined that there were no arguments to be made after the Fourth Circuit opinion, see
id., that was a professional judgment, not an absolute truth. There were, perhaps, more
arguments to be made in favor of constitutionality, at least insofar as the Bostic court had
not heard every plausible justification for prohibiting same-sex marriage that one might
raise. See Bostic, 2014 WL 3702493, at *10-16 (examining five justifications for the same-
sex marriage prohibition brought forth by defendants). Conversely, Cooper had made it
clear prior to his decision not to defend that he was personally opposed to the prohibition
on same-sex marriage, Blythe & Kenney, supra note 81, and could have determined
months ago that there were "no arguments left to be made"; however, he directed his staff
to continue to defend in spite of his objections, see id. By defending until a binding judicial
decision eliminated what Cooper determined in his professional judgment to be the
reasonable arguments in defense of the law, Cooper has taken a balanced approach to the
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direction of deference, requiring defense when any plausible
argument is available, even if inconsistent with the general direction
of the constitutional jurisprudence. Likewise, alternatives may favor
vesting greater independent judgment in the Attorney General,
requiring defense only when the Attorney General has personally
concluded that the law is, in fact, constitutional. While the duties of
state attorneys general vary widely, at least some of those attorneys
general who have refused to defend state laws would trend toward
the latter interpretation.116
What is perhaps most important to recognize is that independent
constitutional judgments in light of the oath of office are not binary;
rather, they cover a wide range of available options, and the power to
decline defense wanes as arguments supporting constitutionality
become more readily available. Thus, provided the North Carolina
Attorney General can successfully assert the lack of support for a
law's constitutionality, the oath of office provides a potent argument
to justify non-defense.
III. FILLING THE HOLES: THE RESPONSE OF OTHER GOVERNMENT
ACrORS
Given the potential political and policy differences between the
Attorney General and other government actors who support the legal
defense of a statute, the Attorney General's decisions concerning the
duty to defend ultimately set up a fascinating legal landscape, rife
with the potential for conflict and replete with legal uncertainty. It is
at once the politico's dream and the lawyer's nightmare. Nonetheless,
these uncharted waters demand some cartographical commitment.
Perhaps the most immediate question concerning the role of
other government actors in defending state law is what steps they may
take to ensure defense when the Attorney General declines.
spectrum.
116. See Shaw, supra note 13, at 238, 243-44 (noting that the California and New Jersey
Attorneys General both declined to defend on the basis of individual determinations of
unconstitutionality). Perhaps the most relevant example of the broader conception of an
Attorney General's independent constitutional judgment is that of Attorney General
Mark Herring of Virginia. See Timothy Williams & Trip Gabriel, Virginia's New Attorney
General Opposes Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/us/new-virginia-attorney-general-drops-defense-of-
gay-marriage-ban.html?_r=0. After taking office, Attorney General Herring reversed the
Commonwealth of Virginia's position as to a federal lawsuit challenging its ban on same-
sex marriage, calling the law "unconstitutional and oppressive." Id. Prior to Attorney
General Herring's election, the state's Attorney General had offered arguments in support
of the law, which suggests that at least some reasonable arguments were available in its
defense. See id.
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However, the Attorney General and his or her staff may engage in
non-defense in a number of ways, even while technically participating
in the litigation."' Thus, examining the legal options of other
government actors when the constitutionality of a state law is
challenged is actually twofold. First, if the Attorney General declines
to defend, what actions can and must other government actors take to
defend the law in court? Second, if the Attorney General discharges
the duty to defend, but with obvious political or policy stances that
conflict with the challenged law, what actions can and must other
government actors take to ensure an "adequate" defense? This part
examines both of these questions in turn.
A. The Attorney General Declines to Defend
If the Attorney General declines to defend the constitutionality
of a state law based upon one of the justifications discussed above,
what may other major government players do about it? The question
is a simple one, but the answer is not obvious. The different branches
of government have different legal options available.
1. The Governor
Should the Attorney General decline to defend the
constitutionality of a state law, the government official with the
clearest legal authority to take up the defense would be the
Governor. The North Carolina Constitution establishes the office of
the Governor, in whom "[t]he executive power of the State shall be
vested."" This inherent executive power, on its own, would likely be
sufficient to justify executive defense of a statute once the Attorney
General has declined to participate.119 Thankfully, however, this is an
area where statutory authority provides additional guidance,
confirming the Governor's authority to engage in legal defense of
state laws. 2 0
Section 147-14(a) of the General Statutes states, "In any case or
proceeding, civil or criminal, in or before any court or agency of this
State or any other state or the United States, . . . the Governor may
117. See Shaw, supra note 13, at 259.
118. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 1.
119. The constitutional order clearly places the Attorney General within the executive
branch. N.C. CONST. art III, § 7. Although the Supreme Court of North Carolina has
stated that the Attorney General's duty to defend is not in derogation of the Governor's
inherent executive authority under Article III's vesting clause, see Martin v. Thornburg,
320 N.C. 533, 546, 359 S.E.2d 472, 480 (1987), if the Attorney General declines defense,
the inherent executive power would arguably still cover legal defense of the state's laws.
120. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-17(a) (2013).
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employ such special counsel as he may deem proper or necessary to
represent the interest of the State."121 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina has stated that this statute "gives the Governor the
unrestricted right to employ such special counsel as he may deem
proper or necessary."122 As a result, in the event the Attorney
General declines to defend, the Governor certainly would have legal
authority to retain outside counsel to defend the constitutionality of
the state laws.
Legal authority to act, however, does not equate to a duty to act.
Despite the power to engage outside counsel to defend the State, the
question remains as to whether the Governor, as wielder of the
executive power of the state, has the ultimate obligation to do so in
the event the Attorney General refuses. There certainly is not the
same statutory basis for the Governor's duty to defend as exists for
the Attorney General. In fact, the statutory authority to employ such
special counsel in section 147-14(a) is merely permissive, not
mandatory.123 Likewise, the gubernatorial duties set out in the state
constitution do not expressly direct the Governor to legally defend
the laws of the state.124 The Constitution does include a so-called
"Take Care" clause, stating that "[t]he Governor shall take care that
the laws are faithfully executed,"125 but does this clause demand
executive defense in addition to enforcement?
There is no legal authority in North Carolina that directly
answers the question, and the federal government has essentially
determined that the identically worded "Take Care" clause in the
U.S. Constitution does not create a duty to defend.'26 Moreover, even
if the clause were construed to create such a duty, the Governor
would likely still be able to claim the same arguments related to the
oath of office that might justify non-defense by the Attorney General
in the first place.2 In sum, in North Carolina, there does not appear
to be any gubernatorial duty to defend. The Governor may certainly
engage counsel at his or her discretion to represent the State, but the
Governor does so at his or her pleasure.
121. Id.
122. Martin, 320 N.C. at 548, 359 S.E.2d at 480 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
123. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-17(a) (2013).
124. See N.C. CONST. art. III.
125. See N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5.
126. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Shaw, supra note 13, at 214-16.
127. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
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2. The General Assembly
The potential for a complete refusal by the entire executive
branch to engage in defense of a state statute places the General
Assembly in a difficult position. Consider the situation that could
arise when the Attorney General and the Governor are of similar
political and policy persuasions, while a different political party
controls the General Assembly.'28 The General Assembly passes a
law that both the Attorney General and the Governor oppose. The
Governor vetoes the bill, but the General Assembly passes the bill
over his or her veto. A lawsuit challenges the constitutionality of the
new law, and the Attorney General, asserting the common law duties
to the public interest, declines to defend, while the Governor, who
objects to the bill, refuses to employ counsel to represent the State.
What can the legislature do?
a. Representing the General Assembly Versus Representing the
State
A first possible response may be that the General Assembly, like
the Governor, may simply hire outside counsel to represent the
interests of the State. The legal authority to undertake such an action,
however, is not clear. Unlike the statutory guidelines that direct the
Attorney General to represent the state in court and allow the
Governor to employ counsel to do the same, the General Assembly is
granted no such explicit statutory power. 129 Likewise, the constitution
seems to contemplate that the legal representation of the State's
positions falls to the executive branch.3 o As a result, it would seem
that the legislative power to hire outside counsel to represent the
State's interest in court would be, at best, based on shaky legal
footing and, at worst, in conflict with the doctrine of separation of
powers.
128. This political dynamic was the very situation during the 2011-12 session of the
General Assembly, when Republicans controlled majorities in the both chambers of the
legislature, while the Governor and Attorney General were both Democrats. See Bonner
& Biesecker, supra note 11. Although issues of non-defense did not arise, several laws
indeed passed over the veto of the Governor during that time. See, e.g., Lawmakers
Override Perdue's Budget, Fracking Vetoes, WRAL (July 2, 2012), http://www.wral.com
/news/state/nccapitollstory/11274537/ (last updated July 3, 2012).
129. No statute within the section on the General Assembly discusses outside
employment of counsel to represent the State's interest.
130. The Supreme Court of North Carolina recognized the common law right to
defend is within the purview of the Attorney General, now an executive officer. Martin v.
Thornburg, 320 N.C. 533, 545-46, 359 S.E.2d 472, 479 (1987). Moreover, the statutory
exception to this duty places the power to hire outside counsel in the Governor, also an
executive official. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-17(a) (2013).
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It is important, however, to distinguish the power to represent
the State's interest in court from the power to represent the General
Assembly's interest in court. Although courts have not explicitly
discussed the legality of such action, it is a well-settled practice of the
General Assembly to engage outside counsel to represent its own
interest as a co-equal branch of government.131 As recently as January
of 2013, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has made such an
acknowledgment.132
In that case, Dickson v. Rucho,"' several groups challenged the
constitutionality of the State's recent redistricting plans.'34 The
General Assembly's legislative leadership, including the chairs of the
Redistricting Committees in both chambers, engaged outside counsel
to provide legal advice regarding the redistricting process.135 When
the legislative leaders claimed that their communications with these
private attorneys were privileged, the Court acknowledged that these
documents were subject to attorney-client privilege by nature of the
engagement." 6 The authority of the General Assembly's leadership to
engage outside counsel in their official capacity was never referenced
or challenged."' In fact, the outside counsel continued to represent
the legislative leaders in conjunction with the Attorney General's
office throughout the litigation, signing briefs as representatives for
the "legislative defendants," while the Attorney General's staff
signed briefs as representatives of "all defendants."" 8 Thus, although
the General Assembly may not possess the power to represent the
State as a party, it does have the power to engage outside counsel to
represent its own interests in court. While this may be a significant
power, it does not provide much assistance if the General Assembly is
not named a party in the suit. Thus, if the State is a named party when
the constitutionality of a law is challenged and the legislative
131. See, e.g., Dickson v. Rucho, 366 N.C. 332, 737 S.E.2d 362 (2013) (discussing
present and past use of independent outside counsel by the General Assembly). Notably,
while all other state government entities must gain the approval of the Governor and the
written consent of the Attorney General to engage outside counsel, the General Assembly
has explicitly exempted itself from these requirements. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-32.6
("G.S. 114-2.3 and G.S. 147-17 (a) through (c) shall not apply to the General Assembly.").
132. See Dickson, 366 N.C. at 334-35, 737 S.E.2d at 365.
133. 366 N.C. 332, 737 S.E.2d. 362 (2013).
134. Id. at 335, 737 S.E.2d at 365.
135. Id. at 334, 737 S.E.2d at 365.
136. Id. at 345, 737 S.E.2d at 372.
137. See generally Dickson, 366 N.C. 332, 737 S.E.2d 362 (discussing the use of
independent outside counsel).
138. Legislative Defendants' Brief at 46-47, Dickson v. Rucho, 366 N.C. 332, 737
S.E.2d 362 (2013) (No. 201PA12), 2012 WL 3043758.
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leadership is not, what options does the General Assembly have to
defend the law?
b. Legislative Standing
In the summer of 2013, the General Assembly provided one
answer to this question by enacting a new "legislative intervention"
statute. 139 Under this statute:
The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
Pro Tempore of the Senate, as agents of the State, shall jointly
have standing to intervene on behalf of the General Assembly
as a party in any judicial proceeding challenging a North
Carolina statute or provision of the North Carolina
Constitution. 140
The statute requires such legislative intervention to proceed
according to the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.14 ' Under
Rule 24(a)(1), "[u]pon timely application," a court will permit anyone
to intervene "[w]hen a statute confers an unconditional right to
intervene." 42 That would appear to be the case under the new law.
The language states that the legislative leadership "shall ... have
standing to intervene" in "any" case in which the constitutionality of
state law is challenged.143 Thus, this would be an "unconditional
right," under Rule 24, and a state court would be required to permit
intervention as a party.'" Accordingly, as intervening defendants, the
Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate could
engage independent counsel to defend the law.
139. Act of Aug. 23, 2013, ch. 393, § 3, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 1626, 1626 (to be codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-72.2).
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-72.2 (2013).
141. Id. The statute apparently includes a misprint, stating that Rule 29 sets out the
correct procedure, which governs the taking of depositions. See id. Legislators have
acknowledged that Rule 24 is the correct rule. See Laura Leslie, Lawmakers Give Leaders
Legal Standing, WRAL (July 26, 2013), http://www.wral.comlawmakers-give-leaders-
legal-standing-/12705623/. The General Assembly corrected this typographical error in
2014. Act of Aug. 11, 2014, ch. 115, § 18, 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws _, _ (to be codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-72.2).
142. N.C. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
143. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-72.2 (2013).
144. N.C. R. Civ. P. 24(a). One interesting and currently unanswered question is
whether this right of intervention even applies at the appellate level, because the North
Carolina appellate courts operate under the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
Procedure, not the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Arguably, if the General
Assembly failed to intervene at the trial court level, they would not have an absolute right
to intervene later in the case at the appellate level.
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In federal court, however, the same outcome is not mandated,
due primarily to different procedural rules and constitutional standing
requirements. Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does
not mandate intervention as the result of a state law;'45 rather, Rule
24(2) provides only permissive intervention at the discretion of the
court "if a party's claim is based on (A) a statute or executive order
administered by the officer or agency; or (B) any regulation, order,
requirement, or agreement issued or made under the statute or
executive order."'4 6 As a result, for cases brought in federal court,
such as a lawsuit initiated by the Department of Justice, the judge
must grant the legislative leaders' request to intervene before they
may proceed. 47
Such an intervention in federal court likewise raises a second,
more complex problem: Article III standing. Federal courts are not
constitutionally empowered to settle disputes unless an "actual
controversy" between two parties with judicially cognizable interests
exists throughout the duration of a case. 48 When the constitutionality
of a state law is challenged in federal court, it is well settled that "a
State has a cognizable interest 'in the continued enforceability' of its
laws that is harmed by a judicial decision declaring the state law
unconstitutional,"149 and that the State therefore has standing to
appeal an adverse decision.s0 A problem may arise, however, when a
party other than the State intervenes to defend the constitutionality
of a law and seeks to appeal an adverse decision,'5 ' and courts must
decide whether that party has a judicially cognizable interest in
continuing the litigation.'52
In a recent case, Hollingsworth v. Perry,'5 3 the United States
Supreme Court took up this question.154 In Hollingsworth, California
voters had passed a voter-led referendum, "Proposition 8," amending
the California constitution to define marriage as between a man and
woman only.'"' After the amendment passed, opponents of
Proposition 8 filed suit in federal court, challenging the
145. FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
146. Id. at 24(b)(2).
147. See id.
148. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013).
149. Id. at 2664 (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986)).
150. See id.
151. See id. at 2662.
152. Id.
153. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2659.
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constitutionality of the law and naming as parties the executive
officials responsible for enforcing its provisions.'56 The Attorney
General and Governor, apparently under the belief that the law was
unconstitutional, declined to defend."' As a result, the referendum's
official proponents under California law moved to intervene so that
they might defend the amendment's legality, and the federal district
court allowed them to do so.15s
When the district court ruled the amendment unconstitutional
and enjoined the state officials from enforcing the amendment, the
state did not pursue an appeal, but the proponents did.159 In
considering their standing to do so, the Ninth Circuit certified a
question to the California Supreme Court and asked whether the
official proponents were, under California law, able to assert the
state's interest in the validity of the law such that they would have
standing to defend on appeal.'" The California Supreme Court
responded that, under state law, the official proponents may assert
the State's interest in the validity of the law should the state officials
charged with that duty refuse.16' The Ninth Circuit thus ruled that the
proponents had standing and proceeded to decide the case on the
merits.162
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument,
holding that because the official proponents had not been affected by
the district court's order, they had no particularized interest in
appealing the judgment.'6 3 In responding to the argument that the
proponents were effectively representing the State's interest in the
validity of the law, the Court stated that, while states could designate
agents to represent their interests, only state officials could be chosen
as agents, not private parties.M
This ruling has interesting implications for the prospect of
legislative intervention in North Carolina. On the one hand, one
could certainly contemplate factual circumstances in which the
General Assembly's role aligns with that of the proponents in
Hollingsworth. The General Assembly could intervene under Rule 24
pursuant to the legislative intervention statute, and the executive







163. Id. at 2662.
164. Id. at 2665.
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officials could decline to defend. Under the general rationale of
Hollingsworth, the General Assembly would not have standing to
appeal because the outcome of the case would not affect its legal
rights or obligations; in short, the legislative body would have no
specific interest at stake.165
On the other hand, the Hollingsworth majority's provision for
the State to identify its own agents, acting pursuant to their official
capacity, would likely also encompass the General Assembly should it
seek to intervene and appeal in a suit challenging a law's validity.166
The language of the new statute likewise bolsters such a claim, as
"state law may provide for other officials to speak for the State in
federal court."'67 Thus, although the legislative intervention statute
does not give an unconditional right for legislative officials to
intervene at the federal level,166 it does provide a legal basis for the
argument that, through this legislation, the State recognizes the
General Assembly as an agent authorized to protect the state's
interest in maintaining the validity of its laws.'69 As a result, the
legislature's best option for defending the constitutionality of a
statute in the event of executive non-defense is likely intervention.
B. The Attorney General Chooses to Defend the Law
Heretofore, the primary discussion has focused on the Attorney
General's duty to defend, whether he or she must discharge such a
duty, and what other branches of government can and must do should
he or she refuse to do so. However, non-defense can come in many
forms.'7 0 This threat of inadequate defense poses what is perhaps an
even more interesting legal question: what options are available to
other government actors to assure an "adequate" defense when the
Attorney General chooses to discharge his or her duty and defend a
law?
165. See id. at 2662 (holding that the official proponents had no individualized interest
in the litigation because "the District Court had not ordered them to do or refrain from
doing anything").
166. See id. at 2664-65.
167. Id. at 2664 ("To vindicate [its] interest [in the continued enforceability of its
laws]... a State must be able to designate agents to represent it in federal court.
(citing Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 288 (1885))).
168. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-72.2 (2013).
169. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664 ("[S]tate law may provide for other officials
to speak for the State in federal court, as New Jersey law did for the State's presiding
legislative officers in Karcher.").
170. See Shaw, supra note 13, at 260 ("If they do participate in litigation, state
executives may undertake weak or perfunctory defenses; they may even express hope that
their positions will not succeed, or satisfaction with decisions against them.").
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At the outset, it is important to recognize an important shift in
the legal issues analyzed under this inquiry. To this point, the inquiry
has focused on the existence of the duties and powers of defense both
in the Attorney General and in other government actors. It has been
established that the Attorney General has both the power and the
duty to represent the State's interest, but also possible legal
justifications for declining to discharge that duty.'71 Likewise, in the
Attorney General's absence, the Governor and General Assembly
have legal options at their disposal that allow them to defend the
validity of a law.
The question from this point forward focuses on the exclusivity of
the Attorney General's duty to defend. In essence, once the Attorney
General decides to defend, to what extent can other government
actors shape the course of the State's legal representation? While this
question touches many of the issues already discussed, it approaches
them in a different context and, in some cases, produces different
answers.
1. The Governor
As discussed above, should the Attorney General decline to
defend, section 147-17(a) grants the Governor the power to employ
counsel other than the Attorney General to represent the State.172
But does the same power apply if the Attorney General chooses to
defend? Section 147-17(a) reads in full:
No department, officer, agency, institution, commission, bureau
or other organized activity of the State which receives support
in whole or in part from the State shall employ any counsel,
except with the approval of the Governor. The Governor shall
give his approval only if the Attorney General has advised him,
as provided in subsection (b) of this section, that it is
impracticable for the Attorney General to render the legal
services. In any case or proceeding, civil or criminal, in or
before any court or agency of this State or any other state or
the United States, or in any other matter in which the State of
North Carolina is interested, the Governor may employ such
special counsel as he may deem proper or necessary to
represent the interest of the State, and may fix the
compensation for their services.173
171. See supra Part II.
172. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-17(a) (2013).
173. Id.
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While the statute does give the Governor the ability to hire
outside counsel, the statute is arguably ambiguous. 17 4 On the one
hand, this power seems to be absolute.17s The broad language of the
second half of the statute appears to bestow vast authority to hire
special counsel "in any case ... as he may deem proper or
necessary. "176 On the other hand, the limitation that the Governor
may only approve employment of counsel for any "organized
activity" of the State if the Attorney General advises him of
impracticability might be read to restrict the ability to hire counsel. 77
This was one of the primary issues at stake in Martin v.
Thornburg."' In that case, the Governor and the Council of State
held different positions regarding the Council's authority to approve
a particular state lease.'79 As the internal conflict continued and the
lease situation remained unresolved, the lessor filed suit against the
State.'s The Governor then brought a declaratory action to
determine "the rights and duties of the Governor and Attorney
General in connection with lawsuits filed against the State."'"' The
trial court held that section 147-17(a) limited the Governor's ability to
hire independent counsel, and that he could only do so when the
Attorney General determined that it was impracticable for him to
represent the State.182 On appeal, however, the North Carolina
Supreme Court reversed, stating that, "construing the statute as a
whole, we conclude that the last sentence of section 147-17(a) gives
the Governor the unrestricted right to employ such special counsel as
he may deem proper or necessary." 183
This case has thus effectively settled the ability of the Governor
to hire outside counsel to represent the State, whether in place of or
in addition to the Attorney General." What is less settled is exactly
how such outside counsel and the Attorney General might interact
while simultaneously pursuing the State's objectives. If the Governor
is a party to the litigation, then the answer is perhaps more
straightforward-the Governor's counsel represents the Governor,
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. See id.
178. 320 N.C. 533, 359 S.E.2d 472 (1987).
179. Id. at 537-38, 359 S.E.2d at 474-45.
180. Id. at 538, 359 S.E.2d at 475.
181. Id. at 535, 359 S.E.2d at 473.
182. Id. at 539, 359 S.E.2d at 476.
183. Id. at 548, 359 S.E.2d at 480 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. Id. at 533, 359 S.E.2d 472.
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and the Attorney General represents the State. If, however, the suit is
against the State, and the Governor is not party to the litigation, the
question essentially becomes, who is in charge of the litigation? Will
the attorneys collaborate? Will they sign separate briefs, both
purportedly on behalf of the state?
Although this question remains largely unanswered, 1ss and there
appears to be no definitive legal rule, the North Carolina General
Statutes offer at least some guidance.' 86 Just as section 147-17(a)
authorizes the Governor and other parties to hire outside counsel in
certain situations,'87 section 147-17(d) provides:
In those instances where more than one counsel is providing
legal representation, counsel, or service on a legal matter on
behalf of a State client, the client shall designate in writing
which of its legal counsel possesses final decision-making
authority on behalf of the State client, and other co-counsel
shall, consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct,
cooperate with such designated lead counsel.s88
At first glance, this statute would seem to give the Governor
wide authority to denote his own counsel as lead counsel and grant
this lawyer final decision-making authority in connection with the
defense of a statute's constitutionality. Such a holding would
seemingly fit with the wide authority granted to the Governor to
engage and set the compensation of counsel in "any proceeding."1 89
However, when the Governor is not a party to the lawsuit but is
instead hiring another lawyer to represent the State as party, it
becomes even less clear who the "State client" is.19 Arguably, the
Governor is not the client, because the attorney has not been engaged
to represent him or her. Instead, the attorney has been engaged to
represent the State.
Furthermore, the Attorney General has some authority to argue
that the power vested in him or her at common law gives him or her
185. In Martin, the court declined to rule on all constitutional issues presented,
resorting simply to a statement that the Attorney General's duty to defend did not
abrogate any of the Governor's rights and powers under the vesting of executive power.
See id. at 548, 359 S.E.2d at 480-81. The court stated that the two positions can and should
co-exist, but failed to give any specific guidelines for how these two rights and obligations
under the current scheme may actually play out in the real world. Id. at 546, 359 S.E.2d at
480.
186. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-17(d) (2013).
187. Id. § 147-17(a).
188. Id. § 147-17(d).
189. Id. § 147-17(a).
190. Id. § 147-17(d).
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the authority to direct the course of litigation, even if the Governor's
outside counsel may participate."' Given his or her role "as primary
legal officer of the state,"'" the Attorney General could conceivably
argue that, even in the employment of outside counsel, he or she
ultimately remains responsible for managing litigation.
One interesting case that may bolster such an assertion is
Atkinson v. State," in which June St. Clair Atkinson, the
Superintendent of the State Department of Public Instruction, a
constitutional officer independently elected statewide, filed suit
against the Governor. 94 The North Carolina Constitution establishes
the State Superintendent as the "Chief Administrative Officer" of the
Department."' In 2009, former Governor Bev Perdue decided to
appoint a Chief Executive Officer to hold all responsibility for the
management of the Department of Public Instruction.196 Atkinson
claimed that such an appointment violated the state constitution, as it
infringed upon her rights and obligations as the Chief Administrative
Officer.'97
The trial court'98 ultimately agreed with Atkinson, stating that
the appointment of a Chief Executive Officer was "unconstitutional
to the extent that it purports to limit the inherent constitutional
authority of the duly elected State Superintendent of Public
Instruction as Chief Administrative Officer of the State Board of
Education." 9 While there is no such constitutional language with
respect to the Attorney General, given the statutory endowment of
common law powers, the Atkinson case may bolster such a claim that
the Attorney General is effectively "Chief Litigation Officer." Thus,
he or she is to be in charge of managing litigation, and any other
191. Morgan, supra note 8, at 166-67 ("In England the Attorney General was Chief
Legal Advisor for the Crown and had charge of the management of all legal affairs and the
prosecution of all suits in which the Crown was interested.").
192. Edmisten, supra note 22, at 10.
193. Atkinson v. State, No. 09 CVS 006655, 2009 WL 8597173 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 17,
2009).
194. Interestingly, Superintendent Atkinson and Governor Perdue were of the same
political party. See Lynn Bonner, Atkinson Fights to Lead DPI, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.) (Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.newsobserver.com/2009/04/03/52139/atkinson-
fights-to-lead-dpi.html?storylink=misearch.
195. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 4(2).
196. See Atkinson, 2009 WL 8597173, at *1-2.
197. Id.
198. Because the case was never appealed, it offers little by way of binding authority. It
does, however, acknowledge the inherent powers of the constitutional offices that may
bolster the Attorney General's claim as chief litigation officer.
199. Atkinson, 2009 WL 8597173, at *2.
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attorney hired by the Governor or otherwise must ultimately submit
to his or her direction.
At the same time, this seems to contradict the legal scheme set
out in the section 147-17.2@ If the Governor hires outside counsel to
protect the State's interest, it would likely do little good to have that
counsel simply work at the direction of the Attorney General. This
sets up a litigation conundrum that has yet to be fully played out in
the context of conflict between the two government officers. The
State may have two separate and distinct voices ostensibly pursuing
the "same" result, but working independently to do so.
2. The General Assembly
The waters become even muddier if and when the legislative
branch enters the fray. Recall that there is no clear legal authority for
the General Assembly to hire its own counsel to represent the State,
whether in addition to or in place of the Attorney General. 20 1 This
would arguably violate the arrangement contemplated by the
Constitution, in which the power to defend the laws of the state rests
with the executive branch.2" On the other hand, the Attorney
General's constitutional duties are merely "prescribed by law," which
gives the General Assembly wide latitude to legislate the inner
workings of inter-branch relationships when it comes to the defense
of state laws.
During the summer of 2014, the General Assembly took
advantage of this apparent authority to clarify its relationship with the
Attorney General, thereby adding another weapon to its legal arsenal
for defending the constitutionality of the laws it passes, even when the
Attorney General chooses to defend a law. Specifically, the General
Assembly enacted two related statutory provisions of note.203
The first new provision states:
Whenever the validity or constitutionality of an act of the
General Assembly or a provision of the Constitution of North
Carolina is the subject of an action in any court, if the General
Assembly hires outside counsel to represent the General
Assembly in connection with that action, the General
Assembly shall be deemed to be a client of the Attorney
200. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-17 (2013).
201. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
202. See N.C. CONsT. art. III.
203. See The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of
2014, ch. 100, § 17.3A(a), 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws _, (to de codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 120-32.6).
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General for purposes of that action as a matter of law.2
Such an invocation of the attorney-client relationship
accomplishes several things. First, for all actions challenging the
constitutionality of a state law, the Attorney General would owe the
General Assembly all of the relevant professional duties an attorney
owes a client under the Rules of Professional Conduct.20 5 Perhaps
most importantly among those is Rule 1.2, which requires that an
attorney allocate authority such that the client sets the objectives of
the representation, while the attorney retains reasonable authority
over the means. 206 As such, under the new provision, the Attorney
General could not refuse to take an action the General Assembly
directed him or her to take, such as appealing a case.207 Such refusal,
even under the auspices of one of the available arguments for
declining defense, may constitute a breach of the Attorney General's
broader ethical duties as a lawyer. 20 8
Furthermore, as discussed above, section 147-17(d) allows a
"State client" who has employed a lawyer in addition to the General
Assembly to direct which counsel will have final decision-making
authority.2' Arguably, under the new statute, by taking on "client"
status by operation of law when the constitutionality of a statute is
challenged, the General Assembly could hire outside counsel and
direct that counsel to have final decision-making authority.
However, instead of leaving this argument to fall under the
somewhat unclear language of section 147-17(d), the General
Assembly took up a second, related provision that distinctly
establishes this "lead counsel" authority.210 Under this new provision,
whenever the General Assembly hires outside counsel through its
204. Id. (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-32.6(b)).
205. See N.C. Rules of Prof'1 Conduct R. 1.1 to .19 (establishing duties owed by all
attorneys to clients, including competence, diligence, confidentiality, communication, and
loyalty). This represents a rather dramatic shift in the relationship between the Attorney
General and the General Assembly; prior to the enactment of this law, any coordination
between the General Assembly, its attorneys, and the Attorney General's office in
lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of state laws was based on the willingness of the
Attorney General and his staff to allow such coordination.
206. Id. R. 1.2 ("A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives
of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means
by which they are pursued.").
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-17(d) (2013).
210. See The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of
2014, ch. 100, § 17.3A(a), 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws -, _ (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 120-32.6).
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leadership, it will have the authority to designate that counsel as "lead
counsel," who will "possess all final decision-making authority with
respect to the representation." 211 The Attorney General, acting as
''co-counsel," is directed to coordinate with the lead counsel
consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct.2 12
Although these new statutory provisions give the General
Assembly significantly greater authority to shape constitutional
litigation than it has enjoyed in the past, such laws certainly are not
immune to criticism. Perhaps most notably, they invite a number of
constitutional questions, the foremost being whether such laws violate
the separation of powers provided for in the North Carolina
Constitution. 213 Because the legislative language is so new, it is
unclear whether it might be challenged and what the outcome of such
a challenge would be.
Even without these new provisions, however, the General
Assembly still has an option for ensuring an "adequate" defense of
state laws as a result of the intervention statute.214 Although this law
does not raise the same kinds of separation of powers issues raised by
the new provisions,215 drawing the line between representing the
General Assembly as a party and representing the State is nevertheless
an imperfect process, which becomes exceedingly relevant when
revisiting the Article III standing issue in the event the Attorney
General does, in fact, defend a law. Recall that when the Attorney
General declines to defend, Hollingsworth suggests that legislative
leaders, acting in their official capacity, may serve as the agents of the
State and have the right to appeal an adverse ruling on the
constitutionality of a state law.216 Arguably, this dynamic changes
when the Attorney General is defending the law. When the General
Assembly is no longer the lone "agent" of the State, the legislative
branch, even acting in its official capacity, has no interest to
211. Id. (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-32.6(c)).
212. Id.
213. There is an argument to be made that the new law is an unconstitutional
infringement by the General Assembly upon the Attorney General's role as an executive
officer and his common law powers to represent the state. See supra Part I.B. Conversely,
because the only constitutional statement regarding the Attorney General's powers is that
they are to be "prescribed by law," N.C. CONST. art. III, § 7, the General Assembly
likewise has an argument that the office's powers are simply whatever the legislature says
they are and therefore the law is well within the bounds of the constitution.
214. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-72.2 (2013).
215. The law does not seek to abrogate executive authority, but rather to supplement it
by allowing the legislature to intervene as a separate party.
216. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2013).
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vindicate.217 Like the proponents in Hollingsworth, the General
Assembly is unaffected by the outcome of the litigation with respect
to their rights and obligations. 218 As Justice Roberts puts it, the
General Assembly will not have been "ordered ... to do or refrain
from doing anything." 219 Courts will excuse this "shortcoming" when
the executive declines to defend, primarily on the grounds that the
State should be able to have some official party to represent it.220
However, the General Assembly arguably has no judicially
cognizable interest separate and apart from the State's when the
State's rightful legal agent has chosen to appeal. Like the Proposition
8 proponents, legislators are no longer positioned to represent the
State's interest.221
The Voter I.D. litigation once again is helpful as a hypothetical
example. Imagine, for instance, that Attorney General Cooper has
decided to defend the law, but the General Assembly has intervened
as a party under the legislative intervention statute because the
legislative leadership considered the Attorney General's defense to
be inadequate. The federal district court rules that the law is
unconstitutional. Both the legislative leaders, now parties in the suit,
and the State, acting through the Attorney General, appeal. The State
certainly has an interest in the continued enforcement of its laws,222
and the Attorney General's standing, as representative of the State, is
unquestioned. But is the General Assembly still an "agent" of the
State such that it might also appeal as an interested party? Asked
another way, can the General Assembly's interest in the validity of
the law be separate and distinct from the State's?
Arguably, the "official" vs. "private" party distinction breaks
down when multiple public officials are seeking to establish standing
by contending that they represent the State's interest. 223 Likewise,
state law on the matter is not entirely determinative.224 As a result,
217. See id. at 2663 ("[O]nce Proposition 8 was approved by voters... [p]etitioners
have no role-special or otherwise-in the enforcement of Proposition 8."). Likewise, the
General Assembly has no enforcement interest in its laws, and once its agency status is
lost, it too has no specialized interest.
218. See id. at 2662.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2664-65.
221. See id. at 2663.
222. Id. at 2664.
223. See id. at 2665 ("The point of Karcher is not that a State could authorize private
parties to represent its interest; [legislators] were permitted to proceed only because they
were state officers, acting in an official capacity.").
224. Id. at 2664. In Hollingsworth, the California Supreme Court had determined that,
as a matter of state law, the official proponents of Proposition 8 did represent the State's
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because the interest of the State is already represented by an
executive official (with arguably exclusive legal authority to do so),
the General Assembly, even acting in its official capacity, has no
judicially cognizable interest in the litigation, despite the fact that
state law gives them such standing in state court. Like the proponents
of Proposition 8, its role was to pass the legislation, and a court order
restraining the enforcement of a statute does not restrict its legal
rights.225
The standing issue aside, the practical realities of waging a
defense of the State's laws when two different branches of
government are represented has the potential for conflict. To
complicate matters further, recall that the Governor may hire
independent counsel to represent the interests of the State.2 26 The
Governor's counsel might add his or her own constitutional defenses,
some consistent with that of governmental colleagues, some in
contradiction. This is, perhaps, the full measure of convolution-a
multiplicity of officials across two separate branches of government
claiming to represent the State's interests before the third. Is this
really the situation the law contemplates?
The General Assembly's recent actions help clarify matters to
some degree, but questions still remain. Even if the General
Assembly can ensure representation without intervening by triggering
client status, the degree to which an Attorney General will cooperate
will remain to be seen. Moreover, significant constitutional questions
suggest that such actions may be subject to challenge.
To a certain extent, the Voter I.D. litigation has and will
continue to serve as a guide for how these relationships might
function. Despite his public comments regarding the bill, Attorney
General Cooper acknowledged that it is his office's duty to defend
the law and maintained that his office could adequately defend the
State's interests notwithstanding his own personal disagreements, and
that litigation is ongoing.227 Nevertheless, Governor McCrory hired
independent counsel to represent the State, arguing that Cooper's
comments had undermined his confidence that the State was
interest in defending the validity of the constitutional amendment. Id. Nevertheless, the
Court found that the private party had no cognizable individual interest, and as private
parties, they could not assert the state's interest. Id. at 2665.
225. See id. at 2662.
226. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
227. John Frank & Rob Christensen, NC Attorney General Questions McCrory on
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adequately represented.22 8 In the meantime, the General Assembly
has refrained from intervening as a party but has hired its own
attorneys to advise it throughout the litigation and to work with the
Attorney General's office." Thus, while the waters remain largely
uncharted, further opportunities for disagreement and non-defense
may yield greater guidance in the near future.
CONCLUSION
The "ancient and honorable office" 23 0 of Attorney General has
come a long way from its origins as the personal representative of the
English Crown.23 1 The office has seen significant development in
North Carolina alone.232 Yet, even so, the scope of the powers and
duties of the state's modern Attorney General remain somewhat ill-
defined with respect to the responsibility to defend the validity of
state laws. The statutory duty to defend is possibly obscured by duties
held at common law.233 Those taking the oath of office swear to
protect the laws of the United States and of North Carolina, yet both
the constitution and the laws of the state provide no direction for
when they might conflict.2 34 The suggested framework for identifying
conflict and incorporating traditional notions of executive power may
provide some help, but a vast "zone of twilight" remains." Likewise,
the ability of other government actors to respond remains a sea of
uncertainty.23 6 While this article has shed some light on the
parameters of gubernatorial and legislative authority to defend the
laws of the state, in truth, their ability to do so is certainly not without
question, if not legally, then practically.
What, then, can be done?" Some have suggested moving
constitutional defense out of the Attorney General's purview
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Morgan, supra note 8, at 165.
231. Id. at 166.
232. See Edmisten, supra note 22, at 9-10.
233. See supra Part II.
234. See supra Part II.C.2.
235. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
236. See discussion supra Part III.
237. There are unique political challenges in making changes to this legal landscape.
Reforming the duties of constitutional players always carries an enormous risk. The
legislature may be more likely to do it when it plays to their advantage, but they often do
so with an understanding of the political realities-they may be in the opposite position
very soon. Nevertheless, clarity in the law is something that most can agree is valuable.
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altogether and placing the responsibility in the hands of the
legislature.18 Similarly, continued intra-governmental conflict of this
nature may cause the public to revisit eliminating the divided
executive and placing the office of Attorney General under the
umbrella of the Governor.29 Still others may argue that confusion has
its virtues, and that a system emphasizing the separation of powers
and competing interests is actually best positioned to ensure a robust
legal defense of the state's laws.
What is perhaps less radical, but wholly necessary, is a clarifying
response. When the State lacks a clear, consistent voice, the defense
of its laws is in jeopardy. The General Assembly's actions in 2014
clarified matters to some extent, but the reach of the new laws,
especially its new ability to appoint a lead counsel, raises more
questions even as it answers others. Moreover, while these heady
legal questions deserve thoughtful consideration, one must not forget
the practical challenges associated with intra-governmentally
coordinated legal work. At the end of the day, words must be written
and briefs filed; strategies crafted and hearings held. Whoever
manages to assert final decision-making authority will truly wield
significant power.
These practical realities thus illuminate both the importance and
the limits of the law in this area; it defines respective government
actors' rights and responsibilities, but is also ultimately shaped by
those actors as they attempt to put it into practice. This is a difficult
endeavor, but incremental legislative clarification and a commitment
to reasonable coordination between the Attorney General and other
government actors will go a long way in assuring an adequate defense
of the constitutionality of the State's laws.
JOHN E. HARRIS"
What is perhaps most clear from this Comment is that the state of the law as stands is
undoubtedly unclear.
238. See, e.g., Simon P. Hansen, Comment, Whose Defense Is It Anyway? Redefining
the Role of the Legislative Branch in the Defense of Federal Statutes, 62 EMORY L.J. 1159,
1162 (2013).
239. But see Marshall, supra note 23, at 2448 (suggesting that a divided executive is
actually a better means of securing liberty and governing effectively).
** This piece certainly could not have happened on my own, and a number of people
deserve special thanks. First, a special thank you to my wife, Kerry Anne, whose unending
support is truly remarkable. I must also thank Charlie Loeser-between thoughtful editing
and nearly instantaneous responses to my late night emails, I could not have asked for a
better editor. Finally, a special thanks to those practitioners who have faced the challenges
discussed in this piece and who took the time out of their busy schedules to discuss the
issues with me-your ruminations were invaluable.
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